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Sammendrag 
Miljøet og forskning på rene teknologier 
Artikkelen “The Environment and Directed Technical Change” av D. Acemoglu, , P. Aghion, L. 
Bursztyn, and D. Hemous som ble publisert i American Economic Review i år har fått mye 
oppmerksomhet. Utgangspunktet for artikkelen er at energiteknologier kan inndeles i to familier; rene 
teknologier og skitne teknologier. Forfatterne forklarer ikke dette nærmer, men vi tenker oss at skitne 
teknologier består av teknologier for olje-, kull- og gassutvinning, forbrenningsmotorer, kull- og 
gasskraft etc. Videre at rene teknologier er fornybar energi, hydrogen eller elektriske biler samt nye 
måter å organisere elektrisitetsmarkedet på som gjør det lettere med fornybar kraft.   
Hensikten med å dele teknologier inn i familier er å få frem at teknologiutviklingen er styrt av 
historien, og at forskningen i dag har en tendens til å fokusere på skitne teknologier bare fordi man 
tidligere har forsket mye på det. På den annen side vil fortsatt fokus på skitne teknologier medføre 
høyere og høyere utslipp av klimagasser noe som i artikkelen “The Environment and Directed 
Technical Change” vil føre til katastrofe.   
For å unngå katastrofe må man flytte all forskning fra den skitne teknologifamilien til den rene 
teknologifamilien. Dette er det vanskelig å oppnå ved hjelp av et kvotemarked eller en utslippsskatt 
alene. I følge Acemoglu og hans medforfattere må prisen på utslipp allerede i dag settes svært høyt 
noe som innebærer store kostnader på kort sikt. Forfatterne anbefaler derfor heller at man fokuserer på 
forskningssubsidier dvs. man innfører så store subsidier til forskning på ren teknologi at all forskning 
på skitten teknologi opphører. Økonomien vil da over tid kunne dreie seg bort fra bruk av skitne 
teknologier selv om skatten på utslipp er lav.    
Vi synes tilnærmingen i “The Environment and Directed Technical Change” er meget interessant. I 
denne artikkelen studerer vi modellen i artikkelen nærmere. Spesielt er vi interessert i hvor avgjørende 
en av forutsetningene i den økonomiske modellen er. I modellen er det slik at forskere velger om de 
vil forske på rene eller skitne teknologier. Avgjørende for deres valg er hvor mye de kan forvente å 
tjene dersom de får en ny patent. Imidlertid varer patenter i modellen bare i 5 år. Dette avviker fra 
hvordan det er i andre modeller med patenter. Vi erstatter derfor forutsetningen om femårige patenter 
med en forutsetning om at forskerne beholder inntektene fra patentet så lenge ingen klarer å utvikle et 
bedre patent. 
Dette endrer hovedresultatet i artikkelen. Når forskerne har forhåpninger om å kunne tjene på patentet 
lenger enn i fem år, så vil også fremtidige priser på utslipp spille en rolle. En moderat pris på utslipp i 
dag som stiger i fremtiden kan derfor være nok til å skifte all forskning til rene teknologier. Dette er 
gode nyheter. Det er grunn til å tro at å satse på forskningssubsidier alene for å løse klimaproblemet er 
mer komplisert enn i artikkelen til Acemoglu og hans medforfattere. For det første er det ingen kost-
nader ved å subsidiere forskning og utvikling. For det andre vet myndighetene hvilke rene teknologier 
de bør satse på. En utslippsskatt som er riktig satt løser langt på vei begge disse problemene; den gir 
incentiver til å forske på rene teknologier uten at staten må ut med store summer, og den favoriserer de 
beste rene teknologiene uten at staten trenger å velge. 
1 Introduction
The major claim in Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn & Hemous (2012)
(AABH) is that subsidies for research and development of clean tech-
nologies are crucial for tackling climate change in a sensible way. More-
over, the carbon tax plays a minor role as directed technological change
moves the economy away from dirty inputs.
It is well known that in an economy with several market failures the
rst-best policy is to have a policy targeting each of the market failures.
Several papers have emphasized that, in the presence of environmental
externalities and knowledge externalities in R&D, it is socially optimal
to have a set of policy instruments, e.g. a tax on carbon emissions and a
subsidy for R&D (Goulder & Schneider, 1999; Rosendahl, 2004; Gilling-
ham, Newell & Pizer, 2008; Fischer & Newell, 2008). AABH follow
this tradition by showing that the social optimum can be achieved with
a carbon tax together with a subsidy for clean innovation. However,
AABH argue that the two instruments are necessary because the sub-
sidy deals with future environmental externalities by directing innovation
towards the clean sector, whereas the carbon tax deals more directly with
the current environmental externality by reducing production of the dirty
input.
This statement is at odds with traditional economic thinking: The
carbon tax should correct for both current and future environmental
externalities, while a subsidy for R&D should correct for knowledge
market failures (see, e.g. Popp, Newell & Ja¤e, 2010). Furthermore,
several studies point out that the most cost-e¢ cient single policy to re-
duce emissions is a policy that directly targets emissions (Schneider &
Goulder, 1997; Nordhaus, 2002; Popp, 2006). However, carbon taxes
will not e¤ectively induce clean innovation if the patent life is short,
since future taxes matter little for todays investment decisions in this
context. In a recent paper, Gerlagh, Kverndokk & Rosendahl (2011)
show that optimal R&D policy is linked with carbon taxes when patent
lifetime is nite since R&D is biased towards technologies that pay back
within the patent lifetime.
In their analysis AABH make an unconventional assumption with
regard to the patent lifetime, i.e. that a patent only lasts for one pe-
riod.1 We argue that patents should not expire after one period in a
model that attempts to shed light on R&D subsidies and carbon taxes.
Firstly, following the TRIPS agreement, patent protection is stronger
than AABH assume in most economies, e.g. in the US the statutory
1A period is ve years in AABHs simulations.
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term is 20 years (Chu, 2011).2 Second, in the literature on economic
growth, patents typically have an innite patent lifetime (see Barro &
Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Jones, 2002).3 In particular, this is the standard
assumption in models of directed technological change (see Acemoglu,
2002; 2009). Lastly, future carbon taxes change the relative value of
clean versus dirty technologies and may inuence R&D decisions.
In this note we introduce long-lived patents into the AABH model.
Our research question is to what extent this makes the role of a re-
search subsidy for clean technologies in AABH less crucial. The answer
is clearly to a great extent, as in the most likely of AABH scenarios,
changing this assumption renders the R&D subsidy superuous. With
high elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs which,
below, we argue is reasonable  the optimal carbon tax path gives a
su¢ cient signal to move the economy away from dirty inputs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our change
to AABHs model, while the simulation results are given in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a conclusion.
2 Illustration of long-lived versus one-period patents
In this section we illustrate the di¤erence between our model and AABHs
model. The full AABH model is presented in the appendix. The per pe-
riod prot jit of holding a patent on machine type i of quality Ajit in
sector j 2 fc; dg is given by:
jit = (pjt    jt) 11 LjtAjit;
where  is a parameter, pjt is the price of intermediate inputs of type
j at time t,  jt is the emission tax on intermediate inputs of type j at
time t, Ljt is the labor e¤ort going into producing intermediate inputs
of type j at time t, and nally Ajit is the productivity of machine i of
type j at time t.
When a new innovation is made in machine type i, Ajit bumps up to
(1 + )Ajit, where (1 + ) is the quality step. A scientist cannot target
a specic machine type; instead a scientist is randomly allocated to a
machine type in the specic sector. A scientist engaged in innovation in
2The World Trade Organizations Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) establishes that all member countries must provide
a minimum level of intellectual property protection (patent protection must be avail-
able for inventions for at least 20 years).
3There are several recent papers that incorporate nite patent length and analyze
patent policy in growth models (Futagami and Iwaisako, 2007; Mosel 2011; Acemoglu
and Akcigit, 2012). However, a patent length of one period is not the usual choice in
these models.
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sector j then expects a quality (1 + )Ajt 1 upon successful innovation,
where Ajt 1 is the average quality in j. The average machine quality is
given by Ajt 
R 1
0
Ajitdi.
The probability of a successful innovation is j. Thus, in AABH the
expected prot of an innovator entering sector j is:
E [jt] = j (pjt    jt)
1
1 Ljt(1 + )Ajt 1: (1)
Note that only the current emission tax  jf enters in (1). Note also
that the average machine quality Ajt 1 plays a crucial role. Hence, if Adt
starts o¤much higher than Act, innovators will have tendency to choose
sector d.
In AABH patents expire after one period. We assume that the patent
lifetime is innite. However, at each point in time there is a probabil-
ity that someone successfully invents a better quality and replaces the
current machine type. Denote this replacement rate zjt. The expected
discounted prots jt for a scientist entering sector j at time t is then:
jt = j (1 + )Ajt 1
1P
k=0
kQ
v=1

1  zj;t+v
1 + rt+v

(pj;t+k    j;t+k) 11 Lj;t+k

;
(2)
where rt is the discount rate. Note that in (2) the future tax rates  j;t+k
are included in the expression for the expected prot of the innovator.
This may have signicant implications for policy. Lets say that the
current per period prots are greater in the dirty sector and that the
carbon tax rate rises over a number of future periods. The tax increases
the value of clean machines relative to dirty machines over time. Scien-
tists do not take into account the e¤ect of future taxes if patents last
for one period and they engage in dirty innovations. On the other hand,
if patents are long-lived, scientists take into account that the value of
clean machines improves over time. A switch to clean innovation may
then be induced today without the need for innovation subsidies.
3 Numerical analysis
We use the same parameters as AABH: machine share  = 1=3, prob-
ability of a successful innovation is equal to 0:02 (per annum) for both
sectors, and quality step  = 1 (for parameters that do not directly enter
the R&D sector, see AABH Section V). As in AABH, the length of each
period is ve years. We have simulated 60 periods on all four of AABHs
scenarios. In this note we only present results for the high elasticity -
high discount rate case, i.e. " = 10 and  = 0:015. We see dirty tech-
nologies as being coal power for electricity, gasoline for transport and
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oil for heating, while green technologies are hydro, solar and wind for
electricity, electric cars for transport and energy storage and biofuels for
heating. Clearly, the green technologies are more costly today; however
they provide nearly identical services, thus warranting a high elasticity
of substitution.4
The initial productivity Ad0 and Ac0 are calibrated as in AABH in
each scenario. For a given allocation of scientists, the entire paths of the
development of the productivities are then given. An optimal carbon
tax path is calculated for any given allocation of scientists. By doing
this repeatedly, di¤erent allocations of scientists can then be compared
in order to nd the optimal combination of the carbon tax path and the
allocation of scientists.
The combination of an optimal carbon tax path and an optimal allo-
cation of scientists is not necessarily an equilibrium of the model. That
is, we do not have an equilibrium if, for any period, scientists could
do better by switching sector. A subsidy to R&D is then necessary to
implement the optimal combination of the carbon tax and the optimal
allocation of scientists. Note that for the optimal allocation of scientists
a subsidy for R&D can be added without a¤ecting productivity levels,
production or consumption of clean and dirty goods since the number of
scientists is given.
The replacement rate zjt is crucial with perpetual patents. In each
period all scientist either work in the clean sector or in the dirty sector.
Thus, for the sector in which all scientists work, the replacement rate
must be equal to the probability of successful innovation. Moreover, for
the other sector the risk must be zero since none of the scientists work
in the sector.5
3.1 Results
First, we nd as did AABH, that without regulation all scientists stay
in the dirty sector and a climate disaster happens. By implementing
carbon tax, it is possible to avoid disaster keeping all the scientists
in the dirty sector; however, this is not an equilibrium. In all periods,
scientists would like to switch to the clean sector. As in AABH, welfare
is optimized with all scientists in the clean sector in all periods. This
conguration is in fact an equilibrium without any R&D subsidy. This
4For instance, the electric car Tesla Model S can run more than 300 miles on one
charge, carries 7 passengers and accelerates from 0-60 mph in 5 seconds.
5Let  be the probability of success over ve periods. The per annum probability
in AABH is 0:02. Thus, over ve periods the probability of success is given by
 = P (X  1) = 1   P (X < 1) = 0:096 (by using the binomial cdf). Implicitly we
assume that innovators can only have one success in each period.
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can be seen from the following gures:
Figure 1: Optimal policies with long-lived patents
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In the gure to the left we have drawn the expected prot of entering
the two R&D sectors, given the optimal carbon tax.6 As we can see it
is always more protable to enter the clean sector. Thus, there is no
need for an R&D subsidy since having all scientists in the clean sector is
desirable. Clearly, this result does not change with a lower discount rate
: It would only make future prots from an innovation more protable.
In the gure to the right we can see that, in the beginning, the carbon
tax is increasing before it attens out after 150 years. With perpetual
patents (that only are replaced with some probability), the future higher
tax rates a¤ect current protability of innovations. It is this e¤ect that
renders the R&D subsidy superuous. As we can see from the gure,
the R&D subsidy is zero for all periods.
It is interesting to compare the above results with those of the original
AABHmodel in which researchers are myopic, that is, they only consider
the current period. We get the following results from our simulation
model with one-period patents:
6R-d = Research dirty and R-c = Research clean
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Figure 2: Optimal policies with one-period patents
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In the gure to the left we have drawn the carbon tax for the case
with one-period patents and no R&D subsidy. As in AABH, the carbon
tax then has to be very high initially in order to move scientists to the
clean sector. Finally, in the gure to the right we have drawn the carbon
tax and the R&D subsidies for the case with one-period patents. As in
AABH, there is a temporary subsidy for clean R&D. When the clean
technologies are su¢ ciently advanced, the subsidy is no longer necessary.
Furthermore, the carbon tax is as in Figure 1 since all scientists are in
the clean R&D sector in both cases.
3.2 Discussion
The result that no R&D subsidy is necessary is not a general result.
There are two market failures in the research sectors. One of them
is knowledge spillovers, that is, current research makes future research
more protable. Remember that any innovation increases the average
productivity with a given percentage. Thus, the higher the average
productivity, the higher the absolute increase in productivity.
The other reason why patent owners do not get paid the social value
of their innovation is due to the risk of losing the income from the patent.
This would not have been a problem if the risk was equal between the
sectors, since the number of scientists is given. However, there is only a
risk of losing the income from a patent in the sector in which all scientists
work. This tends to make the di¤erence between the social value of an
innovation and the private value of an innovation larger in the clean
sector as long as it is desirable from a welfare point of view that all
scientists work in the clean sector.
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In the high elasticity of substitution scenario this e¤ect was not
strong enough to outweigh the prot opportunities in the clean sector
created by the carbon tax. However, in the low elasticity of substitution
scenario of AABH (" = 3) the calibration procedure requires the initial
Ad0 to be much bigger than the initial Ac0. Thus, in the low elastic-
ity of substitution scenario the clean technology starts with a greater
disadvantage.
Our simulations then show that the government has to use a tempo-
rary R&D subsidy in order to implement the optimal combination of the
carbon tax path and the optimal allocation of scientists. However, note
that the subsidy deals with the market failure stemming from the risk of
losing the patent. The future environmental externalities are dealt with
by the future carbon tax which also contributes to redirecting scientists
to the clean sector.
4 Conclusion
AABH nd that it is always optimal to use an R&D subsidy to redi-
rect R&D from dirty technologies towards clean technologies in order to
tackle climate change in the most sensible way. Their clear cut result
rests on an unconventional assumption: patents last for only one period.
We relax this assumption and let R&D decisions depend on the present
discounted value of the future income stream from an invention. This
makes the role of a research subsidy for clean technologies in AABH
far less crucial and reestablishes the role of the carbon tax. Removing
the short-lived patent assumption renders the R&D subsidy in AABHs
model superuous in the most likely scenarios. This is good news, as
it is far easier to tax emissions than to pick the right technologies to
subsidize.
There are many more aspects of the AABH model that could be
discussed and that will likely a¤ect the desirability of R&D subsidies for
the clean sector: There is no free entry to R&D, there is no stepping-on-
toes e¤ect which facilitates a corner solution for the R&D sector, and
there are no spillovers between the two classes of technologies. In a model
which includes these aspects we would be surprised if R&D subsidies had
no role. Our main concern with AABH is not that they nd that R&D
subsidies are necessary, but that they downplay the role of a carbon tax.
In our opinion, setting a correct price on carbon emissions now and in
the future should still be an important priority of policy makers.
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Appendix
The model we use is presented in this appendix. We keep the presen-
tation short as our model is identical to AABH except for the patent
lifetime. The tax on carbon emission is paid by the producers of the
dirty input to nal goods production.
Consumers and the environment
A representative household solves
max
1P
t=0
1
(1+)t

[Ct(St)]1 
1 

s:t Ct = Wt;
(3)
where  is the subjective discount rate,  is the intertemporal rate of
substitution, Ct is consumption, St is the environmental quality, (St)
is the costs of environmental degradation, and Wt is per-period income
(from labor, prots, and net transfers). Households use all per-period
income for consumption, i.e. there is no intertemporal trade-o¤ in con-
sumption.
The cost of degradation function is given by
(St) =
(distaster  (St))    1distaster(distaster  (St))
(1  )distaster
; (4)
where (St) is the temperature increase relative to preindustrial levels,
disaster is the critical temperature increase which leads to disaster, and
 is a calibration parameter.
The temperature increase given by CO2 in the atmosphere
(Cco2) = 3 log2(Cco2=280) (5)
where Cco2 is the concentration in parts per million (ppm). Moreover,
AABH denes the critical level of temperature increase as distaster = 6.
This amounts to CCO2;disaster = 1120 ppm. The environmental quality
is related to CO2 in the following way:
St = 1120 max fCco2 ; 280g ;
which given that Cco2  280 can be rearranged to Cco2 = 1120   St.
Then, we can rearrange the temperature increase:
(St) = 3 log2((1120  St)=280):
12
Finally, the law of motion for the quality of the environment is given
by
St+1 =  Ydt + (1 + )St; (6)
whenever the right hand side of (6) is in the range (0; 1120). Whenever
the right hand side of (6) is negative, St+1 = 0. The parameter  denotes
the rate of degradation stemming from emissions from the dirty input
Ydt, while  is the rate of regeneration.
Final goods
Production function of the unique nal good (FG) :
Yt =

Y
" 1
"
ct + Y
" 1
"
dt
 "
" 1
; (7)
where Yct and Ydt is the input of clean and dirty inputs, respectively, and
" is the elasticity of substitution. The price of the FG is normalized to
1 so that
[p1 "ct + p
1 "
dt ]
1
1 " = 1; (8)
where pct and pdt are the prices of the clean and dirty input, respectively.
Production of inputs to FG with carbon tax
Production function of clean and dirty inputs in sector j 2 fc; dg:
Yjt = L
1 
jt
R 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi (9)
where  2 (0; 1), Ljt is labor use, Aijt is the quality of machine type i,
xjit is the input of machine type i, and the number of machine types is
1.
The input rms problem is:
max
Ljt;xjit
n
(pjt    jt)L1 jt
R 1
0
A1 jit x

jitdi  wtLjt  
R 1
0
pjitxjitdi
o
;
where  dt is the carbon tax ( ct = 0) and pjit is the price of machine
type i in sector j 2 fc; dg. The demand for machine type i is then
xjit =

(pjt    jt)
pjit
 1
1 
LjtAjit. (10)
Production of machines
The producers of machines are monopolists and solve
max
pijt
[(pijt    (1  s))xijt]; (11)
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taking (10) as given, where  is the cost, and s is the subsidy rate
to correct for the static monopoly distortion. Costs are normalized to
 = 2 and the optimal subsidy rate that gives price equal to marginal
cost is s = 1  . Then, solving (11) gives the machine price pijt = 2.
The demand for machine type i in sector j is then given by
xjit = (
pjt    jt

)
1
1 LjtAjit: (12)
Innovation
The innovation sector is explained in the main text. The number of
scientist is given and normalized to a measure of 1.
The per period prot of holding a patent on machine type i in sector
j is given by
jit = (1  )2xjit = (1  )
1 2
1  (pjt    jt) 11 LjtAjit;
as long as there are no other machines of type i with higher quality. The
expected discounted prot of a scientist engaged in research in sector j
is then
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